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J. H. BEUSCHERf
SOME TENTATIVE NOTES ON THE
INTEGRATION OF POLICE POWER AND
EMINENT DOMAIN BY THE COURTS:
SO-CALLED INVERSE OR REVERSE
CONDEMNATION
Recent dramatic case law developments raise important questions
about police power regulation and so-called "inverse" or "reverse"
condemnation. Suppose for example, that a zoning regulation pur-
ports to establish a 200-foot set back along a highway. Suppose, fur-
ther, that upon review a court concludes that while a 50-foot set back
might be reasonable, the 200-foot set back is "unreasonable" by at
least 150 feet. Can the affected landowners successfully sue the gov-
ernmental unit which imposed the control claiming "just compensa-
tion" for the "taking" of a 150-foot easement for public purposes?
It is clear that the typical remedy in such a case has been an action
to enjoin the enforcement of the control on the ground that it is con-
stitutionally invalid. Can a landowner choose inverse condemnation
instead? Can he successfully argue that though the control exceeds
governmental regulatory authority, it is, to the extent of 150 feet at
least, a perfectly valid exercise of eminent domain power and that as
a substitute for the eminent domain proceeding which the govern-
mental unit should have brought, but didn't, he is now suing in in-
verse condemnation?
If affirmative answers to these questions are given, the consequences
for land use regulations are going to be of first rank importance.
Clearly the threat to the governmental pocket book will intimidate
t Late Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. This article first appeared
in J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 538-550 (3rd ed.
1964).
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legislative bodies which are considering the imposition of land use
regulatory measures. In those very areas where rapid population
growth and sprawl have stretched governmental capacity to finance
demanded public services, in these very areas the need for rigorous
controls is apt to be greatest., Yet the threat of contingent, and un-
planned for, liability through inverse condemnation would, especially
in these places, deter legislators from enacting the kinds of virile mea-
sures needed. Instead, financial caution would dictate milky-toast,
completely safe and probably ineffective measures. Instead of walk-
ing to the brink of its constitutional powers, the legislative body would
stay far inside the edge.
But is there any real likelihood that a landowner whose property
interests are "unreasonably" impaired by a regulation (without physi-
cal invasion of his land space) can successfully elect to sue for con-
demnation damages instead of electing the orthodox remedy of in-
junction premised on "invalidity?" Is this a real threat to the even
tenor of land use regulating ways?
To understand the current state of case law in this field we must
distinguish:
1. Governmental action which works a physical invasion of the
landowners' space-flooding, low air flights, etc.
2. Consequences to private rights which flow from public im-
provement projects, even though there is no physical invasion
of the landowners' space-change of highway grades, the estab-
lishment of limited access on pre-existing rights-of-way, etc.
3. The extinguishment, without physical invasion, of private
rights, by exercise of powers under government contract. For
example, seizure of incompleted artides and needed materials
so as to destroy materialmen's liens.
4. Destruction or substantial impairment of private property in-
terests by regulation without physical invasion, public im-
provement or government contract action-for example, de-
struction of air access to private lands by governmental regula-
tion.
5. Those early zoning laws which gave a statutory assurance of
compensation to all persons damaged by the zoning restrictions.
1. See, for example, Hightower v. City of Tyler, 134 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) where subdivider sued in inverse condemnation for "property taken"
from him when the city required him to install sewer and water in his subdivision.
The subdivider failed but on the technical grounds that he had waived his right
to sue. Subdivider claimed "that any taking of property by exercise of police
power is a taking within the provision" of the state constitution.
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These statutes did not require a showing of zoning invalidity
under the Fourteenth Amendment in order for the compensa-
tion to become payable-something which is usually required
as a condition to establishment of an inverse condemnation
claim. Nevertheless these early zoning statutes and the cases
decided under them are instructive in that they constitute a
long-since abandoned system for the presentation of monetary
claims for zoning kind of regulation, claims which when al-
lowed were payable through special assessment. They contain
a lesson of what a mess can result when police power zoning
and assurance of monetary payments for restrictions imposed
are mixed.2
In all of these situations federal or state cases have permitted inverse
condemnation. In all of these cases government, having acted without
first taking property interests by formal direct condemnation proceed-
ings was later required on suit by a private land owner to pay what
it would have had to pay, if formal eminent domain had been brought.
Before discussing the cases in some detail and then trying to spot
possible trends into the future, several general points need to be made:
1. The inverse condemnation action is a means of avoiding the
arbitrary sweep of the sovereign immunity doctrine. This im-
munity, as is well known, extends not only to federal and to
state government but even sometimes to the smallest local units.
The sovereign can do no wrong; it cannot be sued without
its express consent. The courts have found various ways around
this doctrine, even where there is no consent, the chief way be-
ing the rule that if the governmental action is "proprietary"
in character then sovereign immunity does not apply. In the
inverse condemnation cases, however, the courts have not found
it necessary to invent an exception to the basic doctrine. They
have stayed strictly and technically within it and have simply
announced that the federal and some state constitutional guar-
antees of just compensation for public takings are self-execut-
ing consents by government to be sued for such compensation.
Thus it is, as we shall see, that an action like one for nuisance
damages, for example, which is barred by the sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, may be brought under this self-executing consent
for inverse condemnation damages.
2. Since in inverse condemnation, government is being treated as
having acquired a property interest, the problem of accurately
and specifically conveying the property interest being inversely
2. See Pera v. Village of Shorewood, 176 Wis. 261, 186 N.W. 623 (1922); An-
derson, Zoning in Minnesota; Eminent Domain vs. Police Power, 16 NAT'L MUNICI-
PAL REV. 624 (1927) and State ex rel. Twin City Building and Inv. Co. v. Hough-
ton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920).
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purchased is present. It may not be present when a landowner
sues a defendant for damages for the tort of trespass or for
nuisance.
3. Except for the cases of actual physical invasion, the inverse
condemnation cases all go beyond the old, primitive and out-
•moded idea that eminent domain compensation is payable for
physical takings only.3 The newer cases make it clear that im-
pairment or destruction of property interests may give rise to
eminent domain liability even though no physical invasion has
occurred.
4. Since the inverse condemnation claim is premised directly upon
language in a constitution, careful attention to this language is
important. For example many state constitutions assure not
only just compensation, but also assure "damages" for takings
of property for public use. These states with damage provisions
may very well, and some do, deny relief for "purchase price"
and insist that the action be brought as under a self-executing
consent to be sued for "damages." Here the problem of de-
scribing the property interest in a conveyance is not present. 4
5. The inverse condemnation cases should remind us that those
writers who emphasize the separate air tight, nonoverlapping
character of the two basic powers-police power and eminent
domain-have been too glib. The cases remind us that we may
have in self-execu.ting constitutional provisions equivalent to
English statutory assurances in certain cases of compensation
upon denial of planning permission under the Town and
Country Planning Act.
6. Where liability in inverse condemnation arises by reason of a
regulation, there is posed the question of whether or not, and
at what point in time, the governmental defendant can avoid
liability by repealing or amending the regulation. Suppose, for
example, a judgment for the value of the plaintiff's property
interest has been entered, is it then too late for the govern-
mental unit to escape liability by repeal?
7. Statements in cases in which land use regulations are annulled
as beyond the reach of the police power often contain broad
sweeping statements that such regulations constitute a "taking"
requiring payment of just compensation. These statements,
made in cases where the issue is whether or not to enjoin the
enforcement of the invalid regulations, may be used by courts
to bolster inverse condemnation claims, where the landowner
is treating the "taking" as valid, but wants just compensation
for the interest taken.
3. See 29 C.J.S. 917 (1941).
4. See Lindas, Ordinary v. Inverse Condemnation (Talk before Legal Affairs
Committee, American Ass'n State Highway Officials, Nov. 1957. Mimeo.).
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With these general points in mind we turn to the cases. The most
easily understood cases have involved actual physical invasion of the
plaintiff's land space. The most dramatic recent instance is Griggs v.
Allegheny County5 decided by the United States Supreme Court on
March 5, 1962. The defendant county acquired land on which it
developed the greater Pittsburgh Airport. At the time it developed
the airport, the county could have acquired an air corridor easement
across plaintiff's land near one of the runways. It did not do so. If
the county had acquired tile easement, the federal government would
have borne up to 50 per cent of the cost. As is the case with commercial
airports throughout the country, the federal Civil Aeronautics Au-
thority fixed the glide paths for the take-off or landing of aircraft.
The lowest edge of the glide path over plaintiff's home was less than
12 feet above the chimneyl In actual fact planes taking off or landing
flew between 30 feet and 300 feet above the house. The plaintiff and
members of his family were frequently unable to sleep even when
using ear plugs and sleeping pills. The vibration from airplane en-
gines was such that plaster fell from the walls and ceilings. A spokes-
man for the Airlines Pilot Association testified, "If we had engine
failure we would have no course but to plow into your house." The
health of the plaintiff and his family was impaired.
The Pennsylvania trial court treated the action as one in condem-
nation, appointed viewers who found (1) a taking of an air easement,
and (2) put a value on the easement of $12,690. The plaintiff ap-
pealed claiming the damages were too low, but the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania disallowed any damage at all, saying that the County
was not the responsible party and indicating that the commercial air
lines were.
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and
held that as operator, promoter and developer of the airport, the
county was responsible in inverse condemnation. Justice Black in a
dissenting opinion indicated that he felt that the Civil Aeronautics
Authority as the maker of the rules was the responsible party and that
this federal agency should be made to bear the burden of paying just
compensation for the air corridor which they had established.
The majority of the Court relied on United States v. Causbye a case
in which the airport was not only operated by the United States Air
5. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). Compare Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382 Pa. 88,
114 A.2d 491 (1955).
6. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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Force but in which the offending planes were also government owned.
It implied that the operator of the airport had the responsibility of
either acquiring an adequate air easement corridor by purchase or
eminent domain at the time the airport was developed, or of paying
for them later in inverse condemnation on a showing that plaintiff's
property in the form of such an easement had actually been taken.
Said the Court in the Causby case:
The airplane is part of the modem environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable un-
der the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the immedi-
ate reaches of the land, is part of the public domain. We need not
determine at this time what those precise limits are. Flights over
private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so fre-
quent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the en-
joyment and use of the land. We need not speculate on that phase
of the present case. For the findings of the Court of Claims
plainly establish that the frequent, low-level flights were the direct
and immediate cause. We agree with the Court of Claims that a
servitude has been imposed upon the land.7
Usually, a police power regulation which is held to constitute a
"taking" of property is treated by the courts as an invalid exercise of
the power of regulation and instead as an exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. But in the Causby case the Court is careful to make it
dear that the glide path rules are perfectly valid police power mea-
sures. They are directives to air lines which must be obeyed. If, in
order to fulfill these directives, air easements over private property
must be acquired, then, according to the Griggs case, it is up to the
airport operator to acquire them, either initially when the airport is
developed or subsequently, if necessary, through direct or inverse con-
demnation.
We have then a case where valid federal aviational rules require
planes to fly so low as to be "a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land." The operator of the airport takes
the rules as given and must so arrange air easement approaches as may
be necessary to avoid claims in inverse condemnation. It should per-
haps be stressed that Causby is very careful not to describe precise
levels below which air servitudes must be purchased. Among other
things, of course, this is a function of the noise and vibration caused
by aircraft engines and these vary with developing technology.
It is interesting to compare the landowner's problems in the Causby
7. Id. at 266-67.
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and Griggs cases with the plight of a couple of resort operators in the
upper reaches of the Superior National Forest, which culminated in
Bydlen v. U.S. in the Court of Claims.$ To protect and preserve the
wilderness characteristics of this forest, an Executive Order was issued
prohibiting air flights, except in emergency situations, at less than
4000 feet elevation. Access to the resorts by air was far more conven-
ient than access by land and water. But to land resort guests, it was
necessary for the aircraft to violate the 4000 foot ceiling order. Such
violations occurred and were enjoined,9 with the federal court of ap-
peals flatly declaring the flight ceiling order valid. The resort owners
then tried to open a land route to their places of business by way of
a logging road owned in part by private firms and in part by the gov-
ernment. 10 Again they were unsuccessful. Barred from effective access
to their places of business, they sued the federal government in the
Court of Claims. They premised their claims on the contention that
their "property," namely a right of access by air, had been "taken"
from them so that under the self-executing consent of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the United States was subject to suit and to liability for "just
compensation." The Court of Claims in the Bydlen case allowed their
claims" and no appeal has been reported.
Just as in the Causby and Griggs cases inverse condemnation liabil-
ity was imposed in spite of the fact that the air flight regulation in-
volved was a valid police power measure. But there is a major differ-
ence between the first two cases and case of the two resorters. There
was no physical invasion of the resort owners' air space by outsiders.
Instead in Bydlen we have a case where a bare regulatory measure, un-
accompanied by physical invasion, was held to work such a taking as
to entitle the landowners to just compensation in an inverse condem-
nation action.
The Causby and Griggs cases can be classified with numerous other
cases of physical invasion, (1) flooding, by construction of a dam, a
highway or other public improvements;2 (2) raising the groundwater
8. 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
9. Perko v. U.S., 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953); cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953).
10. Perko v. Northwest Paper Co., 133 F. Supp. 560 (D. Minn. 1955).
11. Bydlen v. U.S., 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
12. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871); U.S. v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238
(1958); and see 47 Ky. L.J. 215 (1959); 1960 U. OF ILL. L. FoRum 313 (1960);
Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and its Agents for In-
quiries (sic) to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TZNN. L.
Rzv. 801 (1941); 18 U. CH. L. REv. 355 (1951).
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table by reason of a public improvement;13 (3) imposition of special
burdens like concentrations of gas and smoke by reason of a public
improvement;14 the backing up of sewers or drains15 the erection of
a bridge or utility wires across private land;26 and the washing away of
riparian land caused by erection of a bridge or other public improve-
ment.17 Attorneys for highway departments have become accustomed
to floods of claims each spring when snow melt water retarded by high-
ways floods private fields.'s
Much closer to the Bydlen case are inverse condemnation cases in-
volving highway access rights or highway easements of light, air and
view.'19 In these cases as in the Bydlen case there is typically no physical
invasion of the claimant's land space. All of the cases I have looked
at do involve physical changes or improvements-erection of a barrier
to create cul de sacs, building of curbs, dividers, bridges, frontage
roads, etc. But these changes or improvements are placed on publicly
owned right-of-way-they do not directly invade the claimant's private
domain. They do, however, directly implement the police power ac.
tion, closing a street, limiting access to it, etc., and thereby in some
factual settings are said to "take" private rights of access, light, air,
or view, so as to require compensation in inverse condemnation ac-
tions. This is not the place to get involved in the complicated snarl
of case law that exists around the question of when there is a "taking"
requiring compensation and when, on the other hand, the action in-
volved is a reasonable and therefore legitimate exercise of regulatory
power.
Suffice it to point out that in the Bydlen air access case and in the
highway right-of-access cases, American courts have in inverse con.
demnation cases done something which they have long since done in
direct condemnation actions. They have moved from the earlier primi.
tive position requiring a physical invasion or taking to a set of hold-
ings which say that loss of intangible property interests may be a basis
for a claim of just compensation.
13. U.S. v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
14. Richards v. Washington Term. Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
15. See 29 C.J.S. 932 (1941).
16. See 16 R.C.L. 68 (1915).
17. U.S. v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
18. See Lindas, Drainage-Inverse Condemnation (Talk before Legal Affairs
Committee, American Ass'n State Highway Officials, Oct. 12, 1961. Mimeo).
Sometimes these claims are based on consent statutes, rather than on the constitu-
tion directly.
19. See Lindas, supra note 4; R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIOHwAy Acc-ss
223 (1963).
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The Restatement of the Law of Property has made it dear, follow-
ing the earlier Hohlfeldian analysis, that "property" in the technical
sense is not the tangible thing owned; it is a bundle of intangible in-
terests that exist only in men's minds. Within the property interest
bundle are "rights" to keep others off, "powers" to transfer that which
is owned, and "privileges" to use that which is owned. The Bydlen
case and the highway access inverse condemnation cases are basically,
then, cases in which landowners whose privileges of use have been
substantially curbed by public action are granted just compensation
under the applicable federal or state constitutional mandate. It is
interesting to note that although physical obstructions are usually
erected, the action which basically takes the "privilege of use"-the
property interest-is a police power action destroying or substantially
curbing the exercise of the privilege. Will the courts, building on these
access right cases, allow, in the future, eminent domain in reverse for
any police power action which is interpretcd as having interfered too
substantially with intangible rights-there being no physical invasion
or physical implementation of the police power order. The Bydlen
case points in this direction. And Professor Dunham has urged that
we go all the way:
A restriction on land utilization ideally should be imposed only if
society can see clearly that the gains to be obtained by the restric-
tion outweigh the cost. Reverse condemnation would help us
strike a balance.20
He points out that in the typical case today the landowner upon
whom an onerous regulation is imposed, ordinarily attempts to get a
judicial determination that the regulation cannot be applied to his
land. If he succeeds, his land goes free of regulation and this may de-
stroy the effectiveness of the plan for the area. An inverse condemna-
tion procedure, he feels, would prevent this in many cases. It would
also, Dunham believes, cause those who impose land use regulations
in a democratic society to proceed with care and on a rational basis.21
In fact, the regulators may proceed with so much caution, particularly
where local finances are strained by costs of extending public services
to mushrooming developments, that very little if any effective regula-
tory implementation of the plan will get enacted.
20. Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U.
L. REv., 1238, 1254 (1960).
21. It is interesting that J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 661
(1833), pointed out 130 years ago that the Fifth Amendment just compensation
clause was an important protection against irresponsible legislation.
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Nevertheless, the Dunham suggestion is a completely logical exten-
sion of the present case law of inverse condemnation. Two fairly re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court cases may contain omens for the future. In
the first, that of U.S. v. Central Eureka Mining Co.,22 the regulation
closing gold mines for a period during World War II was held valid
and not to constitute a "taking" so the inverse condemnation claim
was denied. Nevertheless, a dictum in the Court's opinion is worth
quoting as a possible indicator of what the future might hold. The
Court first said: "It is clear ... that the Government did not occupy,
use or in any manner take physical possession of the gold mines. .. ."
And, then, nevertheless, went on to say, "We have recognized that
action in the form of regulation can so diminish the value of the prop-
erty as to constitute a taking."
In short, the Court dearly indicated that had it concluded that the
gold mine closure order was beyond the reach of the police power, it
would have allowed inverse eminent domain compensation, even
though no physical seizure or entry of the mines had taken place.
The second case is more telling.2 3 Rice entered into a contract with
the federal government for the construction of eleven boats. Material-
men supplied materials to Rice and by the law of Maine had material-
men's liens for purchase money still owing them. Subject to the lien,
title to the materials, and to the uncompleted boats, was in Rice. The
contract provided, however, that in case of default by Rice, the gov-
ernment could take title to all uncompleted boats and needed mate-
rials on hand, and then complete the boats at the contractor's expense.
Rice defaulted, the government exercised its powers under the con-
tract and completed the boats. Armstrong and other lien claimants
asserted that the government's action destroyed their liens and that
this destruction was a taking of property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, for which they wanted compensation. The United
States Supreme Court upheld the contention of the lienholders and
sent the case back for ascertainment of the value of the destroyed
liens. Said the Court:
Neither the boat's immunity, after being acquired by the Govern-
ment, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract to
take title relieves the Government from its constitutional obliga-
tion to pay just compensation for the value of the liens the peti-
tioners lost and of which loss the Government was the direct,
positive beneficiary.
22. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
23. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rv.
275 (1960).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1968/iss1/2
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.2 4 (Italics supplied.)
Clearly the sweep of the italicized language is broad enough to
support an inverse condemnation claim for the destruction or sub-
stantial impairment of any property interest by a regulatory measure
(with or without physical invasion or seizure) where a court decides
that the regulation goes beyond the range of legitimate regulation in
that it forces the property owner to bear a financial burden which "in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
This broad statement may push the inverse condemnation remedy into
areas of regulation in which it has not yet been used. Besides there
is the appeal of logic behind the argument: Look, we have moved in
the law of direct condemnation from a primitive definition of "tak-
ing" as requiring an actual physical occupation of the land to the de-
struction or serious impairment of intangible interests without physical
invasion, so why shouldn't we now move this full distance for inverse
condemnation also? Why should we insist on compensation for an
intangible interest in unoccupied land where condemnation is ini-
tiated by the government and refuse it where the condemnation action
is brought by the landowner?
Yet in spite of (1) Professor Dunham's suggestion that inverse con-
demnation be broadened as a way of checking arbitrary land use regu-
lation; (2) the sweep of the Armstrong language and the language in
other inverse condemnation cases and (3) the appeal of logic just
noted, the courts may very well refuse to extend inverse condemnation
beyond its present scope.
Judges who conclude that extension of inverse condemnation is an
alternate remedy in any case where police power regulation is held
invalid for constitutional reasons, might
1. Drastically affect the finances and operation of government;
2. Tend to make governing bodies unduly cautious;
24. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. at 40 (1960). In addition, there are of
course numerous broad statements in injunction cases that the particular police
power measure being declared invalid and enjoined was a taking requiring just
compensation. But in none of these cases was the landowner seeking compensa-
tion. In all of them he was successfully having a law declared unconstitutional
so he wouldn't have to obey it. See, for example, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922); East Coast Lumber Term. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d
106 (2d Cir. 1949).
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3. Encourage some governing bodies to use direct condemnation
on the assumption that landowners affected by enacted regula-
tions may succeed in convincing courts that the limits of fair-
ness and justice had been exceeded.
Other judges might conclude that regulation should be tested as
regulation, in the atmosphere that produced it. It should not (at least
not in all cases) be subject to the possible construction that though
regulatory in form is actually an exercise of eminent domain author-
ity.25
Other problems present themselves as one speculates about both the
present law of inverse condemnation and its possible future extension.
One of these problems has to do with conveyancing. Certainly if the
government is to pay fair compensation for a property interest steps
should be taken to see to it that the interest is specifically and accu-
rately transferred to the government. Easements for flooding, drain-
age and access represent kinds of interests which have been the subject
of conveyances for generations; they normally pose no serious prob-
lems in terms for inverse condemnation transfers. But when one thinks
of the wide variety of limitations on use of land that might be held in
particular settings to constitute takings, then there are posed tough
problems of describing just what the inverse condemnation compen-
sation is buying-right of view, reservation of land in existing uses,
excessive set-backs, height regulations, lot size controls, single use re-
straints, house size controls, etc., etc. Sometimes regulations which
limit the use of land will not be stateable in conveyancing terms. For
example, suppose that an ordinance or statute imposes a limitation
on the platting of land, namely that $200 per lot be paid into a special
fund reserved for school site or park purchase. Suppose a court says
this exceeds the reach of the police power. Can a landowner sue for
"just compensation," namely the value of his land without the regu-
lation and its value with the regulation in force?
A second problem relates to whether or not a governmental unit
which has been held to have taken property by regulation, can free
itself of liability for just compensation by the simple expedient of re-
pealing or altering the regulation. Presumably it can, so far as the
future is concerned, if it acts before a court has entered judgment. But
the regulation may have been substantially and adversely affecting
claimant's property interests for some time before repeal or change.
The claimant would apparently be entitled to just compensation for
the value of this temporary interest taken from him.
25. See Note, 66 HAav. L. REv. 1134 (1953).
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Where an inverse condemnation judgment has been entered and
paid and thereafter the regulation is repealed or so changed as no
longer to work a "taking," the governmental unit is left owning an
unusable interest in the claimant's land. At the same time this pub-
licly owned interest "encumbers" the marketability of the landowner's
title and the government may be in a position to collect back some or
all of what it paid as the price of a release of the encumbrance.
Thus, for example, suppose that after Allegheny County through
payment of the inverse condemnation judgment has purchased a spe-
cifically described air corridor over Griggs' land, the CAA glide path
regulations are changed so as to require planes to pass over the land
above this corridor, at so high an elevation that there is no longer any
taking. Or suppose that because of a realignment of the runway,
planes no longer use the corridor across Griggs' land. The county still
owns the air corridor easement. If a prospective purchaser from Griggs
wants to build up into the corridor, a repurchase of all or part of the
air easement will have to be negotiated.
Or again, assume that a court has held that by a limited access order,
the state has "taken" Jones' right of access to a highway. An ifiverse
condemnation judgment has fixed its value and this amount has been
paid Jones in return for a conveyance of the right of access. Then,
because of the opening of a nearby super-highway, or for some other
reason, the limited access order is repealed. The state owns a negative
easement in Jones' land. Presumably he will have to buy it from the
state if he wants it released.
One could go on with other illustrations: After payment for the air
access easement in the Bydlen case,26 assume that the flight ceiling
order is lifted. Or a flowage easement purchased through inverse con-
demnation is no longer needed because the public improvement that
made it necessary has been removed. But enough has been said to
suggest that in framing inverse condemnation judgments and the
conveyances based upon them, the courts, at least in some kinds of
cases should authorize the insertion of resale provisions in the event
the governmental regulation or program is later altered or abandoned
so as to "repeal" the taking. One possibility applicable to some, but
not to all cases might be the purchase of the property interest in an-
nual installments, it being understood that upon abandonment 'of
the program, further payments would no longer need to be made and
no interest would remain in the government.
26. Bydlen v. U.S., 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. CI. 1959).
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These are matters which will be receiving more attention in the
future than they have in the past, because as an attorney with substan-
tial experience in inverse condemnation actions has said, "I must con-
fess that on the whole, it appears that the courts of the country are
tending more and more to a liberal interpretation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution and kindred state
provisions, in favor of the landowner."27
Certainly it can be agreed that the concept "compensable taking" is
general and vague enough to allow expansion of the inverse condem-
nation mantle so as to include more and more type situations. This
has been the history of inverse condemnation to date, there is no rea-
son to expect that the trend will not continue. On the other hand,
the courts in dealing with this flexible concept have focussed sharply
on differing sets of facts case by case. It may be that the courts will
identify as controlling against use of inverse condemnation, the fact
that the governmental action in question was taken in a setting in
which the governmental body was thinking solely in terms of regula-
tion and had no public improvement or other activity in mind that
could possibly lead to inverse liability for "takings." The courts, in
short, might conclude that it is undesirable public policy to permit
the purchase of compliance with unauthorized regulations and in such
cases they may continue to insist that the landowner's sole remedy is
an injunction against enforcement premised on a judicial finding of
invalidity.28
In this connection the courts may give understandable emphasis to
the scope of enabling statures, so far as concerns administrative agen-
des and local units of government. If the governmental "regulation"
is beyond the scope of the delegated power, it should be fairly easy.
to refuse inverse condemnation, unless, of course, the same govern-
mental body has clear eminent domain authority over the subject
matter. Again, where delegated regulatory authority is present in the
enabling act, but where the governmental body has been granted no
eminent domain power for the type of interest involved, courts may
find an easy out. They may conclude in this situation that the land-
owner's only recourse is to have the regulation declared invalid, emi-
nent domain is not available. But the difficulty with the latter position
is that most inverse condemnation holdings are not premised on statu-
tory delegations of eminent domain authority but directly on the con-
stitutional assurance of just compensation.
27. See Lindas, supra note 4.
28. See Note, supra note 25.
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